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Abstract: the recent decision of the Internatio-
nal Court of Justice in the case between Croatia 
and Serbia provides us with the opportunity to 
reassess the relationship between state and in-
dividual responsibility for international crimes. 
Although limited to the commission of acts of 
genocide, the judgment shows that the concep-
tual framework explaining such relationship is 
now well settled. However, the Court seems 
to reach solutions that at times are not entirely 
consistent with the premises of such conceptual 
scheme. The purpose of the following analysis 
is to test the general theoretical approach with 
respect to a number of issues dealt with by the 
Court in its recent decision. 
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Resumo: a recente decisão da Corte Interna-
cional de Justiça no caso entre Croácia e Sérvia 
nos oferece a oportunidade de reavaliar a rela-
ção entre responsabilidade individual e estatal 
por crimes internacionais. Embora limitada ao 
cometimento de atos de genocídio, a sentença 
demonstra que o quadro conceitual explicando 
tal relação é ora bem definido. Contudo, a Corte 
parece chegar a conclusões que por vezes não 
são completamente consistentes com as pre-
missas de tal quadro conceitual. O objetivo da 
análise é testar a abordagem teórica geral em 
relação a alguns problemas lidados pela Corte 
em sua recente decisão.
Palavras-chave: Crimes Internacionais. Res-
ponsabilidade Individual e Estatal. Casos Ge-
nocídio.
1 The General Approach Towards dual Responsibility
The Court was asked to rule on Croatia’s claim and Serbia’s 
counter-claim both concerning the alleged commission of genocide by 
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the other party1. Eventually, the Court rejected both: it found evidence 
that material acts of genocide had been perpetrated, but was not provided 
with sufficient evidence that those acts had been committed with the 
required specific intent to destroy in whole or in part a particular group, 
i.e., genocidal intent. One of the central issues of the case regarded the 
relationship between state and individual responsibility for genocide 
under international law. Indeed, certain facts at issue before the Court had 
already formed the subject of proceedings before the International Criminal 
Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). And the Court had to clarify 1) 
whether state responsibility could be assessed even though the individual 
criminal responsibility of its organs for the same conduct had not been 
previously established and 2) which probative value could be attributed to 
the decisions of the ICTY, since no accused before the Tribunal had been 
convicted with regard to the facts at issue before the Court.
As to the first question, the Court recalled what it had already 
observed in the 2007 decision on the genocide case between Bosnia 
and Serbia: “State responsibility can arise under the Convention for 
genocide and complicity, without an individual being convicted of the 
crime or an associated one”2. Therefore, a state can in principle be held 
responsible for genocide even if none of its organs has been convicted 
for genocide. In addition, the Court noted that: “State responsibility and 
individual criminal responsibility are governed by different legal régimes 
and pursue different aims. The former concerns the consequences of the 
breach by a State of the obligations imposed upon it by international law, 
whereas the latter is concerned with the responsibility of an individual 
[…] and the resultant sanctions to be imposed upon that person”3. The 
Court could not express more clearly the separation between the regime 
of state responsibility and the regime of individual criminal liability 
1 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, 3 February 2015 [hereafter: 2015 Genocide 
case], available on the Court’s website (www.icj-cij.org).
2 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment [hereafter: 
2007 Genocide case], I.C.J. Reports 2007, para. 182.
3 ICJ, 2015 Genocide case, para. 129.
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for international crimes. In other words, different sets of secondary 
rules entail state and individual responsibility. As far as genocide 
is concerned, the Court explained that state responsibility would be 
established according to “the rules of general international law on the 
responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts”4. But the same 
would undoubtedly apply to the establishment of state responsibility for 
other international crimes. On the other hand, individuals are convicted 
or acquitted by applying the secondary rules of international criminal 
law5. One of the clearest signs of this separation between the regimes of 
state and individual responsibility for international crimes is that there are 
different and independent bodies charged with enforcing obligations of 
states and obligations of individuals under international law. Thus, just as 
“it is not for the Court to determine the individual criminal responsibility 
for such acts”6, it is not for international criminal tribunals to determine 
state responsibility for international crimes7.
As to the second question, the Court clarified that the jurisprudence 
of international criminal courts and tribunals might nonetheless be 
taken into account in the establishment of state responsibility as far as 
the “constitutive elements” of the crime of genocide are concerned. 
In other words, the establishments of the ICTY were relevant as far as 
the violation of primary norms is concerned. The same case law was 
irrelevant in the application of the secondary norms of state responsibility. 
Indeed, the Court added that: “If it is established that genocide has been 
committed, the Court will then seek to determine the responsibility of the 
State, on the basis of the rules of general international law governing the 
responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts”8. Accordingly, 
individual and state responsibility are separate regimes of responsibility 
but they are entailed by the breach of the same primary obligations.
4 Ibid., para. 128.
5 See for example ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgment, 2 August 2001, 
para. 2. 
6 ICJ, 2015 Genocide case, para. 129.
77KLVKDVEHHQD൶UPHGIRUH[DPSOHE\WKH,&7<LQProsecutor v. Kunarac et al., IT-96-
23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, 22 February 2001, para. 470.
8 ICJ, 2015 Genocide case, para. 129.
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Other conceptual schemes can certainly be envisaged and have 
actually been put forward by international scholars9. However, the 
conceptual scheme adopted by the Court, according to which state and 
individual responsibility originate from the violation of the same primary 
rules but consist of different sets of secondary rules, seems to have gained 
wide support. It was already at the basis of the 2007 decision in the 
Bosnia v. Serbia case10; it is reflected in the works of the International 
Law Commission (ILC)11; it is reaffirmed in the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC)12; and has been expressed in similar 
terms by ad hoc tribunals13. It must be added that this conceptual scheme 
is not limited to the crime of genocide but is capable of explaining the 
relationship between the regimes of state and individual responsibility 
with respect to all “core crimes” prohibited under customary international 
9$WOHDVWWZRRWKHUDSSURDFKHVFDQEHLGHQWL¿HGDQLQGLYLGXDORULHQWHGDSSURDFKDFFRUGLQJ
to which international criminal law is fully independent from state responsibility as even 
WKHSULPDU\QRUPVHQWDLOLQJVWDWHDQGLQGLYLGXDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\DUHGL൵HUHQWDQGDVWDWH
oriented approach according to which individual criminal responsibility is to be understood 
as nothing else but a consequence of the regime of state responsibility. For a detailed 
analysis, see B.I. Bonafé, The Relationship between State and Individual Responsibility for 
International Crimes/HLGHQ%RVWRQ0DUWLQXV1LMKR൵S
10 ICJ, 2007 Genocide case, paras 163, 173 and 182. 
11 The ILC Articles on State Responsibility include a without prejudice clause – article 
58 – according to which “These articles are without prejudice to any question of the 
individual responsibility under international law of any person acting on behalf of a 
State” (General Assembly resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001). The ILC Draft Code 
of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind include a similar clause – article 4 – 
which reads: “The fact that the present Code provides for the responsibility of individuals 
for crimes against the peace and security of mankind is without prejudice to any question 
of the responsibility of States under international law”. 
12 Article 25, paragraph 4, of the ICC Statute reads: “No provision in this Statute relating 
WR LQGLYLGXDO FULPLQDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ VKDOO D൵HFW WKH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ RI 6WDWHV XQGHU
international law”. 
13 See in particular ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, 10 
December 1998, para. 142 (“Under current international humanitarian law, in addition to 
LQGLYLGXDOFULPLQDOOLDELOLW\6WDWHUHVSRQVLELOLW\PD\HQVXHDVDUHVXOWRI6WDWHR൶FLDOV
engaging in torture or failing to prevent torture or to punish torturers. If carried out as an 
H[WHQVLYHSUDFWLFHRI6WDWHR൶FLDOVWRUWXUHDPRXQWVWRDVHULRXVEUHDFKRQDZLGHVSUHDG
scale of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human 
being, thus constituting a particularly grave wrongful act generating State responsibility”).
Seqüência (Florianópolis), n. 73, p. 19-36, ago. 2016 23
Beatrice I. Bonafè
law, namely, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and the crime 
of aggression14. 
As a consequence, while consistency should be ensured in the 
application of primary norms, the establishment of individual and state 
responsibility remain separate. With respect to the same facts, a state 
might be responsible while the individual perpetrator can be acquitted 
– and the other way around – according to the requirements of each 
responsibility regime and the actual possibility to prove them15. 
In practice, however, one has to admit that it is not always easy 
to decide whether a certain norm is primary or secondary16 in character 
and this may not facilitate the application of the described conceptual 
scheme. On the other hand, international courts display a certain tendency 
to apply very similar standards in the establishment of both kinds of 
responsibility17. A closer look at the case law of the International Court 
of Justice reveals that state responsibility has only been established in 
connection with facts that had already entailed the individual criminal 
responsibility of their authors. Then the question is whether this practice 
puts into question the general conceptual scheme just described. 
14 Today it is no longer doubtful that those crimes entail not only state responsibility but 
also individual criminal responsibility. See in general A. Cassese, International Criminal 
Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003. 
15 See for example “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the 
United Nations Secretary- General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 
September 2004”, Geneva, 25 January 2005.
16 The distinction between primary and secondary norms was proposed as a general criterion 
to codify the law of state responsibility by Special Rapporteur Ago in his “Second Report 
on State Responsibility”, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1970, vol. II, p. 
179. See also J. Combacau and D. Alland, “Primary and Secondary Rules in the Law of 
State Responsibility: Categorising International Obligations”, Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law, 1985, pp. 81–109; J. Crawford, “First Report on State Responsibility”, 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/490, paras. 12–18; P.-M. Dupuy, “A General Stocktaking of the 
&RQQHFWLRQVEHWZHHQWKH0XOWLODWHUDO'LPHQVLRQRI2EOLJDWLRQVDQG&RGL¿FDWLRQRIWKH
Law of Responsibility”, European Journal of International Law, 2002, p. 1059. For a 
broader conception of secondary rules, see, H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1994, pp. 79–99 (originally published in 1961).
176HHLQWKDWUHJDUG%,%RQDIpVXSUDQRWHS൵
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2 The Overlap of Primary Norms
In 2007 the Court recognised that “if a State is to be responsible 
because it has breached its obligation not to commit genocide, it must be 
shown that genocide as defined in the Convention has been committed”18, 
and the same approach is taken in 2015. Accordingly, for the Court the 
definition of genocide provided by article II of the Genocide Convention 
represents a primary norm whose violation entails state responsibility just 
as it entails individual criminal responsibility. This explains the relevance 
accorded to the case law of international criminal courts and tribunals 
not just in the establishment of facts but also in the interpretation of the 
primary rules to be applied when assessing that an international crime 
has been committed. This explains why the part of the Court’s decision 
dedicated to the interpretation of the primary norm on the prohibition of 
genocide strongly relies on the case law of the ad hoc tribunals.
With respect to the “actus reus” of genocide, the Court carries 
out a detailed analysis of the various limbs of article II of the Genocide 
Convention in order to determine their meaning and scope. And the 
decision of the Court systematically refers to the case law of the ad hoc 
tribunals before reaching conclusions on the interpretation to be given to 
article II which are entirely consistent to the decisions already taken by 
those tribunals19. 
A similar approach is taken with respect to the “mens rea” of 
genocide. This element of the definition of genocide was the object of 
specific analysis in the 2007 judgment – to which the recent decision 
refers – and the conclusion of the Court is that the dolus specialis required 
under article II of the Convention must be established in order for states 
to incur international responsibility for genocide20. Similarly, the Court 
upholds a definition of this element that corresponds to the one applied by 
international criminal tribunals. 
18 ICJ, 2007 Genocide case, para. 180. 
19 ICJ, 2015 Genocide case, paras 154-163.
20 ICJ, 2007 Genocide caseSDUD൵
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This position of the Court has been criticised because it would 
have erroneously applied a typical requirement of the regime of 
individual criminal responsibility – the mens rea – to the regime of 
state responsibility where such secondary rule should not be applied. 
According to Gaeta, 
[f]or the international responsibility of the state to arise, however, 
there would be no need to demonstrate that the state as such – or 
one or more of its officials – harboured a genocidal intent in the 
criminal sense. This is a requirement that only pertains to the 
criminal liability of individuals21.
Under international criminal law, the mens rea is a fundamental 
ingredient of individual responsibility, as the latter is grounded on the 
principle of personal culpability22. The accused cannot be convicted if 
he or she has not materially participated in the commission of the crime. 
International criminal law rejects the application of vicarious liability. 
But this is not enough. The psychological participation of the accused in 
the offence must be proved as well. There are various degrees of mens 
rea under international criminal law, but this fundamental requirement 
must always be established beyond reasonable doubt. The mens rea is a 
characterizing feature of the international regime of individual criminal 
responsibility – as it is under national criminal law – and is the expression 
of a general secondary rule that applies independently of the crime 
allegedly committed by the accused. 
To a certain extent, a similar concern is expressed in the rules 
governing state responsibility. Indeed, states cannot be responsible 
for the conduct of private persons. This result is ensured through 
the application of a different set of secondary norms, namely, those 
concerning attribution. However, no state fault is required under the 
general regime of state responsibility. This does not exclude that certain 
primary norms provide for a state fault requirement. As the ILC clarified 
21 P. Gaeta, “On What Conditions Can a State Be Held Responsible for Genocide?”, 
European Journal of International Law, 2007, p. 643. 
226HHLQJHQHUDO$&DVVHVHVXSUDQRWHS൵
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in the commentary on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, “[a] 
related question is whether fault constitutes a necessary element of the 
internationally wrongful act of a State. This is certainly not the case if by 
‘fault’ one under – stands the existence, for example, of an intention to 
harm. In the absence of any specific requirement of a mental element in 
terms of the primary obligation, it is only the act of a State that matters, 
independently of any intention”23. 
Accordingly, the recognition that genocide requires the proof 
of a mens rea element in the establishment of both state and individual 
responsibility is not inconsistent with the general conceptual scheme 
described above. In principle, the mental element marks a clear distinction 
between the two regimes unless a primary norm requires this element to 
be established in order to find state responsibility. 
Still, a certain distinction between the mens rea of the state 
and the mens rea of the individual charged with the same prohibited 
conduct amounting to an international crime can be maintained at least 
in principle. The purpose of the former requirement is to establish the 
psychological participation of a single person, while the latter aims at 
establishing the “mental” participation of a collective entity such as a 
state. This distinction may however be blurred in practice. 
International criminal tribunals held that the mens rea should in 
principle be inferred from the personal conduct of the accused, i.e., 
words or deeds or a pattern of purposeful action, but they accepted 
that the general criminal context might play a role in that regard. For 
example, with respect to genocide, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) admitted that “it is possible to deduce the genocidal 
intent inherent in a particular act charged from the general context of the 
perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against that 
same group, whether these acts were committed by the same offender 
or by others. Other factors, such as the scale of atrocities committed, 
their general nature, in a region or a country, or furthermore, the fact 
of deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their 
membership of a particular group, while excluding the members of 
23 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II(2), p. 36. 
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other groups, can enable the Chamber to infer the genocidal intent of a 
particular act”24. As to the ICTY, it recognised that acts not amounting to 
genocide can be taken into account when establishing the genocidal intent 
of the accused25. Furthermore, it must be recalled that the genocidal intent 
need not be proved, and a lower standard of mens rea suffices, when the 
person convicted for genocide has been found guilty as an accomplice 
or under the doctrine of command responsibility. In other words, certain 
modes of liability do not require proof of genocidal intent as such26.
On the other hand, the International Court of Justice has considered 
that state “mens rea” need not be proved by showing that individual 
state organs harboured genocidal intent. State fault can be established 
indirectly by relying on a “pattern of conduct” pointing to the existence 
of genocidal intent27. In practice however the Court has never established 
state responsibility for genocide in the absence of a prior conviction of the 
responsible state organs, that is, in the absence of a judicial decision having 
already found that the genocidal intent could be attributed to state organs. 
3 The Separation of Secondary Norms 
The case law of the International Court of Justice clearly relies on 
the separation of the regimes of state and individual responsibility under 
international law. It suffices to recall how the Court reacted to the Tadic case 
in which the ICTY had ruled on the criteria for attributing individual conduct 
to a state and distanced itself from the “effective control” criterion applied by 
the Court in Nicaragua: “the ICTY was not called upon in the Tadic case, nor 
is it in general called upon, to rule on questions of State responsibility, since 
its jurisdiction is criminal and extends over persons only”28. 
This separation entails two main consequences. The two regimes 
include different secondary rules, such as those governing attribution 
24 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 523. 
25 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 580. 
26)RUDPRUHGHWDLOHGDQDO\VLVVHH%,%RQDIpVXSUDQRWHS൵
27 ICJ, 2015 Genocide case, paras 139 and 148.
28 ICJ, 2007 Genocide case, para. 403. 
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or reparation. The two regimes are complementary in the sense that 
individual criminal responsibility is no substitute for state responsibility 
and the reparation of the victims of international crimes by the responsible 
state does not preclude the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over the 
offenders. As explained by the ILC, 
[w]here crimes against international law are committed by State 
officials, it will often be the case that the State itself is responsible for 
the acts in question or for failure to prevent or punish them. In certain 
cases, in particular aggression, the State will by definition be involved. 
Even so, the question of individual responsibility is in principle distinct 
from the question of State responsibility. The State is not exempted 
from its own responsibility for internationally wrongful conduct by 
the prosecution and punishment of the State officials who carried it 
out. Nor may those officials hide behind the State in respect of their 
own responsibility for conduct of theirs which is contrary to rules of 
international law which are applicable to them29. 
However, the Court is not always consistent with this conceptual 
scheme. Two examples with respect to the crime of genocide are provided 
by the recent decision settling the dispute between Croatia and Serbia. 
3.1 Responsibility for Isolated acts of Genocide?
Under the general regime of state responsibility, “the conduct of 
any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international 
law”30. No matter if the breach is isolated or state organs commit repeated 
breaches, the state would be responsible under international law. As far as 
genocide is concerned, in addition to the attribution of the material breach 
state responsibility requires the establishment of state fault. This may 
be a difficult element to prove but two main possibilities are available: 
either proof is given of the mental element of those state organs who have 
29 ILC Commentary on article 58 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 
22, p. 142, para. 3. A similar stand is taken by the ILC in the commentary on article 4 of 
the Draft Code of the Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind, Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 1996, vol. II(2), p. 24.
30 Article 4 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility (emphasis added).
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committed the wrongful act, or state fault is established at a more general 
level by relying on a pattern of conduct pointing to the existence of a 
certain state intention31.
As already noted, the Court has made it clear that no prior conviction 
of the responsible state organ is required to hold a state responsible for 
an international crime. Therefore, in principle the establishment of state 
responsibility is completely independent from the issue of individual 
criminal responsibility32. However, the 2015 decision of the Court does 
not seem entirely consistent with such premises. 
Being “fully convinced that, in various localities in Eastern 
Slavonia, Western Slavonia, Banovina/Banija, Kordun, Lika and 
Dalmatia, the JNA and Serb forces perpetrated against members of the 
protected group acts falling within subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article 
II of the Convention, and that the actus reus of genocide has been 
established”33, the Court moved to the assessment of the genocidal intent 
having inspired those acts and concluded, as mentioned, that Croatia 
had not established that those acts were committed with the specific 
intent required for them to be characterized as acts of genocide34. The 
main reason for this was that “the acts committed by the JNA and Serb 
forces essentially had the effect of making the Croat population flee the 
territories concerned. It was not a question of systematically destroying 
that population, but of forcing it to leave the areas controlled by these 
armed forces”35. In other words, the Court confirmed the position already 
adopted by the ICTY in a number of judgments that the 2015 decision 
frequently mentions and in which the ICTY was not asked to establish 
whether genocide had been committed36. So it remains obscure what 
has prevented the Court from asking whether those acts could also have 
pointed to the existence of a genocidal intent. The sole contribution of 
316HH%,%RQDIpVXSUDQRWHS൵
32 The question is not directly relevant here but the same is true for individual criminal 
responsibility with the partial exception of the crime of aggression. 
33 ICJ, 2015 Genocide case, para. 401. 
34 Ibid., paras 402-440. 
35 Ibid., para. 435.
36 The same can be said of the conclusion concerning Serbia’s counter-claim. See para. 506.
30 Seqüência (Florianópolis), n. 73, p. 19-36, ago. 2016
Reassessing Dual Responsibility for International Crimes 
the Court was to consider that in any case 12.500 Croat deaths was a 
“number of victims […] small in relation to the size of the targeted part 
of the group”37. Inevitably, one wonders why the Court has not carried 
out an independent assessment. The fact that the ICTY had not convicted 
any accused for genocide and had not even charged any individual with 
genocide38 is not a sufficient reason for the Court to refrain from carrying 
out an independent assessment of state responsibility. 
What is even more curious is the way in which the Court easily 
dismissed evidence that seemed to point to the existence of a genocidal 
intent on the part of Serb paramilitary forces. Paragraph 438 reads: 
Croatia points to activities of Serb paramilitaries as evidence of the 
dolus specialis. In particular, it relies upon a videotape of Zeljko 
Raznatovic or ‘Arkan’, leader of a Serb paramilitary group known 
as the ‘Serbian Volunteer Guard’ or ‘Arkan’s Tigers’, made during 
the siege of Vukovar on 1 November 1991, showing him instructing 
his forces to take care not to kill Serbs and saying that since Serbs 
were in the basements of buildings and the Croats were upstairs, 
rocket launchers should be used to ‘neutralize the first floor’. 
Even if Arkan’s actions were attributable to Serbia, this speech 
appears to be but one isolated phase in the very lengthy siege of 
Vukovar, a siege in which, as the Court has already found (see 
paragraphs 218-219, 301 and 305 above), the degree of violence 
used by attacking forces was excessive, and during which grave 
suffering was undoubtedly caused to the civilian population as 
Serbia acknowledged at least to some extent. It is difficult to infer 
anything from one isolated instance. Croatia also relies upon the 
report of a JNA security officer, dated 13 October 1991, which 
stated that Arkan’s troops were ‘committing uncontrolled genocide 
and various acts of terrorism’ in the greater area of Vukovar. The 
Serbian Assistant Minister of Defence was informed of the report. 
Yet taking the report as a whole, no justification or examples are 
given to support the use of the word ‘genocide’.
37 Ibid., para. 437. The Court adopted a similar view in considering Serbia’s counter-
claim. See para. 512. 
38 Ibid., para. 440. 
Seqüência (Florianópolis), n. 73, p. 19-36, ago. 2016 31
Beatrice I. Bonafè
Certainly, one is aware of the fact that it can be extremely difficult 
to prove that isolated acts of genocide have been carried out with the 
required dolus specialis39. However, this possibility is not ruled out by the 
definition of genocide. If it were possible to establish that state organs had 
committed isolated acts of genocide with the required genocidal intent, 
why would the state not be responsible? We can agree with the Court 
when it notes: “it is difficult to establish such [genocidal] intent on the 
basis of isolated acts”40. But this does not prevent the Court from at least 
trying. In other words, the Court could have carried out a more detailed 
analysis of the evidence before it and should have explained the reasons 
why it concluded that ‘Arkan’s Tigers’ had not acted with the required 
mens rea. 
3.2 Different Standards of Proof?
The issue of the standard of proof applicable to the establishment of 
state responsibility for genocide had been crucial in 2007 when the Court 
adopted its judgment in the genocide case between Bosnia and Serbia. 
That decision had been criticised41 because it referred to a number of 
different standards of proof and among them the “beyond any reasonable 
doubt” standard that is typically applied in international criminal 
proceedings42. This is a very high standard and finds no precedent in the 
Court’s case law dealing with state responsibility. 
The decision rendered in the Croatia v. Serbia case simply refers to 
the 2007 decision for the definition of the applicable standard of proof, 
although it makes an attempt to use a more uniform terminology. Claims 
of genocide must be proved by evidence that is “fully conclusive” and the 
Court must be “fully convinced” that genocide has been committed43. It is 
39 See in particular ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jelisic, IT-95-10-T, Trial Judgment, 14 December 
1999, paras 100-101.
40 ICJ, 2015 Genocide case, para. 139. 
41 See for example A. Gattini, “Evidentiary Issues in the ICJ’s Genocide Judgment”, 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2007, p. 889.
42 ICJ, 2007 Genocide case, in particular paras 312, 314, and 422. 
43 ICJ, 2015 Genocide case, para. 178. 
32 Seqüência (Florianópolis), n. 73, p. 19-36, ago. 2016
Reassessing Dual Responsibility for International Crimes 
according to this standard of proof that the Court reaches the conclusion 
that material acts falling within article II of the Genocide Convention had 
been committed44. 
Apparently, the Court has adopted a different standard of proof 
as far as the dolus specialis is concerned. In this case, the existence of 
the genocidal intent must be “the only inference that could reasonably 
be drawn from the acts in question”45. It must be noted that the decision 
carefully avoids any reference to the “beyond any reasonable doubt” 
standard. However, when establishing the mens rea of genocide it insists 
on two elements: the fact that the inference must be the “only” inference 
possible and the “reasonableness” of that inference. With respect to 
Croatia’s claim, the Court could not conclude that the “only reasonable 
inference” that could be drawn from the pattern of Serb acts constituting 
the actus reus of genocide was the intent to destroy in whole or in part 
the Croat group46. With respect to Serbia’s counter-claim, the Court 
was unable to conclude that the pattern of conduct on the part of the 
Croatian authorities could “only reasonably” be understood as reflecting a 
genocidal intent. 
It seems that in the end the standard of proof applied by the 
Court is nothing else but the “beyond reasonable doubt” that is typical 
of international criminal law. The judgment itself admits: “the criterion 
applied by the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Judgment in the Tolimir case 
is in substance identical with that laid down by the Court in its 2007 
Judgment”47. In addition, the opinions of some judges confirm that the 
Court should apply the same standard of proof as applied by international 
criminal tribunals48. However, this conclusion is not entirely convincing. 
From the perspective of the relationship between state and 
individual responsibility, one may argue that rules on the standard of 
44 Ibid., paras 401 and 499.
45 Ibid., paras 148 and 417. 
46 Ibid., para. 440. 
47 Ibid., para. 148. 
48 ICJ, 2015 Genocide case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 467, 
and Separate Opinion of Judge Keith, paras 3-4.
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proof are secondary norms and, accordingly, the standards of international 
criminal law are not necessarily applicable in the establishment of state 
responsibility, quite the opposite49. 
The second reason seems more compelling. Even leaving aside 
the ambiguity relating to the application of different standards of proof 
to the establishment of the actus reus of genocide (“fully conclusive” 
evidence) and the mens rea of genocide (“the only reasonable inference”), 
the position of the Court is problematic because it does not justify the 
application in the framework of state responsibility of such a high 
standard of proof as is applied in the establishment of individual criminal 
responsibility. Assuming that the regime of state responsibility is not 
criminal in character50, it is difficult to understand why the application 
of this regime should rely on a standard of proof that is ultimately 
premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. The “beyond 
any reasonable doubt” standard is particularly demanding precisely 
because it is meant to counterbalance the serious consequences attached 
to individual criminal responsibility. The function and nature of state 
responsibility do not seem to require a similar guarantee that could end up 
in unduly restricting the application of the regime of state responsibility 
for international crimes.
The Court seems to justify the application of a higher standard of 
proof with the gravity of the allegations made in the proceedings.51 This 
is problematic for a number of reasons. First, this justification is provided 
with respect to the “fully conclusive” standard only. Nowhere in the 
497KLV LV QRW WR GHQ\ WKH GL൶FXOW\ LQ LGHQWLI\LQJ WKH SULPDU\ RU VHFRQGDU\ FKDUDFWHU
of certain international rules and the fact that certain standards of proof pertain to the 
application of primary norms and others to the application of secondary norms. However, 
one should not loose sight of the function of standards of proof and the connection with 
the aim pursued by the responsibility regime in which they apply. 
50 ILC Commentary on article 12 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra 
note 22, p. 55, para. 5. A previous version of the Draft Articles included a provision on 
“International crimes of states” (article 19). But even in that regard the ILC made it clear 
that it did not intend to establish a criminal responsibility of states. See Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 1976, vol. II(2), para. 59. 
51 ICJ, 2015 Genocide case, para. 178. See also ICJ, 2007 Genocide case, para. 209. 
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judgment does the Court provide a similar justification with respect to the 
“only reasonable inference” standard. 
Second, the Court refers to the merits decision in the Corfu Channel 
case where it had observed that 
[…] [t]he statements attributed by the witness Kovacic to third parties, 
of which the Court has received no personal and direct confirmation, 
can be regarded only as allegations falling short of conclusive 
evidence. A charge of such exceptional gravity against a State would 
require a degree of certainty that has not been reached here52. 
It must be recalled however that in that decision the affirmation of 
the Court had no general scope; the Court was referring to statements of 
third parties; and no clear standard of proof was set out with respect to 
“charges of exceptional gravity”. If the affirmation of the Court were to 
be generalised, it would only imply that “conclusive” evidence is required 
for serious allegations. The conclusion according to which “fully” 
conclusive evidence would be required in such circumstances is entirely 
attributable to the 2007 genocide decision. 
Third, the interpretation of the Corfu Channel case that has just been 
criticised seems to be the only basis for relying on a “fully conclusive” or 
“only reasonable inference” standards. One of the members of the Court 
suggested that “it is a well-settled principle of law that the graver the 
offence alleged, the higher the standard of proof required for said offence 
to be established in a court of law”53. However, when one looks at the 
case law of other international courts and tribunals one must recognise 
that different approaches have been adopted. There are indeed cases 
where the seriousness of the charges has been taken into account54. But 
there are also cases in which it was held that the gravity of the charges 
52 ICJ, Corfu Channel case, Judgment of April 9th, 1949, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 17. 
53 ICJ, 2015 Genocide case, Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari, para. 2. 
54 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velásquez Rodríguez, Judgment, 29 July 1988, 
para. 129.
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does not change the international rules to be applied in order to establish 
state responsibility55.
Finally, the Court held in 2007 and confirmed in 2015 that a higher 
standard of proof “applies to the proof of attribution for such acts [of 
genocide]”56. Unfortunately, no specific reason is provided to justify such a 
conclusion that may reveal extremely problematic. In general, it is difficult 
to understand why this standard of proof should be relied upon in the 
application of secondary rules57. The Court itself recognised, although in 
a different framework, that rules on attribution are secondary rules58. Most 
importantly, it is unclear what does the Court mean when it says that the 
application of rules on attribution, think for example of effective control, 
requires a standard of proof that varies according to the gravity of the 
allegation. Inevitably, the risk is that the standard of proof would have an 
impact on the content of the rule concerning attribution and that attribution 
to the state would vary according to the gravity of the wrongful act.
4 Conclusion
The development of a general conceptual scheme by the Court has 
proved essential to appraise the relationship between state and individual 
responsibility and to ensure their complementarity. However, it remains 
a “conceptual scheme” and what counts is that the Court applies it in a 
consistent manner. Unfortunately this is not always the case. The case law 
examined does not seem to put into question the described conceptual 
scheme. The analysis of the mens rea requirement of genocide provides 
a good example in that regard. Nonetheless, the recent case law of the 
Court on the crime of genocide raises concern because it tends to blur 
the separation between two regimes of responsibility. In practice, state 
55 ICJ, 2015 Genocide case, Separate Opinion of Judge Gaja, para. 4, referring to the 
award of the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission. 
56 ICJ, 2015 Genocide case, para. 178. See also ICJ, 2007 Genocide case, para. 209.
57 See in this respect M. Milanovic, “State Responsibility for Genocide”, European 
Journal of International Law, 2006, p. 597. 
58 ICJ, 2015 Genocide case, para. 104.
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responsibility appears more dependent on the establishment of individual 
responsibility than it should be. In particular, state responsibility should 
not be confined to the safe area where individual responsibility has already 
been established. The risk is that the state would evade its responsibility on 
such crucial issues as the commission of international crimes. 
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